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ARRESTING A SUSPECT IN THE HOME OF A 

THIRD PARTY: THE ISSUE OF 
STANDING OR LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
EDWARD G. MASCOLO· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Sleagald v. Uniled Slales,1 the United States Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the preeminence of privacy interests in the home.. The 
Court held that absent either exigent circumstances or valid consent, 
law enforcement officials may not search for the subject of an arrest 
warrant in the residence of a third party without first obtaining a 
search warrant. 2 
Because this additional requirement of a search warrant un­
doubtedly will create prac!ical problems for the police and the 
courts, the rule of law established in Sleagald may be honored more 
in its breach than in its observance. For example, if the police are 
prohibited from intruding upon the privacy interests of a third-party 
homeowner without the authorization conferred by a search warrant, 
they still may accomplish their quest for the subject, buttressed by 
probable cause presence. The police then may conduct a valid inci­
dental search of the subject or a plain view seizure. In Sleagald, the 
Court stated that entry without authority of a search warrant may be 
justified under a claim of exigent circumstances.3 But if an exigency 
• Research attorney, Office of Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of 
Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief 
of the CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL, 1969-1973; member of the CONNECTICUT BAR 
JOURNAL Editorial Board, 1968-1981; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; LL.B., Ge­
orgetown University, 1952. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone. 
I. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
2. Id. at 213-16. 
3. Id. at 213. This situation may arise with some frequency. See, e.g., United 
States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 737, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), cerro denied, 445 U.S. 934 
(1980); Virgin Islands V. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928-29 (3d Cir. 1974), cerl. denied,420 
U.S. 909 (1975); Fisher V. Volz, 496 F.2d 333,336-37,344-45 (3d Cir. 1974); Lankford V. 
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 199-200, 201-02 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc). Moreover, probable 
cause evidence of guilt sufficient for the issuance of an arrest warrant is not legally sy­
nonymous with probable cause evidence of situs. See Fisher V. Volz, 496 F.2d at 341; 2 
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.1, at 
381 
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claim fails, a court will be left with the issue whether the subject of 
an arrest warrant has the right to invoke the privacy benefit of a 
search warrant in the residence of a third party. 
Although Steagald required a search warrant, it did not address 
the right of the subject to insist upon the warrant. The question of a 
subject's privacy rights in a third-party residence will confront a 
court if the subject of an arrest warrant moves to suppress evidence 
seized without benefit of a search warrant. This question, which im­
plicates the separate privacy interests of the subject and the home­
owner and the invocation of the exclusionary rule,4 will be the focus 
of this article. While narrowly drawn, it is an issue which is impor­
tant to the administration of the criminal justice system. 5 
Before analyzing the right of the subject of an arrest warrant to 
claim the benefit of a search warrant in the home of a third party, 
this article first will review the requirements for standing to invoke 
the protections of the fourth amendment.6 The rationale of Steagald 
then will be analyzed, with particular emphasis upon the separate 
privacy interests of the subject and the homeowner. The article will 
conclude that, as the separation of privacy concerns precludes the 
subject of an arrest warrant from invoking the requirement of a 
search warrant in the third-party residence, the courts should not re­
384 (1978). Thus, at the time the police apply for an arrest warrant, they may not possess 
adequate information concerning the location or presence of the suspect to justify the 
issuance of a search warrant. See Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d at 928-29. The 
Third Circuit, in Gereau, recognized that "probable cause may exist to believe that a 
suspect ... is in more than one location." Id. at 929. But this factor offieeting presence 
will serve to both compound the difficulty of obtaining a valid search warrant and 
heighten the reliance of the police upon exigent circumstances. Finally, the duration of 
exigency itself may be so transitory as to be destroyed after the police have arrived to 
effect an arrest and just prior to entry. Id. 
For an analysis of warrantless arrest in the home under exigent circumstances, see 
Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALB. L. 
REV. 90 (1980); Mascolo, Emergency Arrest in the Home, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 387 
(1981). 
4. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence secured through an unlawful 
search and seizure is inadmissable at trial. The exclusionary rule was established and 
held applicable to federal criminal proceedings in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914). Its application was extended to state proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
5. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 231 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
6. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but ul'0n probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma­
tion, and particularly descnbing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to De seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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quire the presence of a search warrant in the event that entry under 
exigent circumstances is rejected. 
II. 	 CRITERIA FOR STANDING: LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS 
OF PRIVACY 
Standing embodies the right to be heard, that is, the right to 
challenge police action.7 Before an individual has standing to attach 
the lawfulness of a search or seizure, he must show that his fourth 
amendment privacy interests have been violated. If he makes the 
requisite showing of a fourth amendment violation, he will be able to 
exclude evidence gathered by law enforcement officers as "a means 
for making effective the protection of privacy."8 
The issue of standing, therefore, involves two inquiries: First, 
whether the movant for suppression or exclusion has alleged an ac­
tual injury to his interests and rights under the fourth amendment;9 
and second, whether the movant has asserted his own interests and 
rights "rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third 
parties."10 Because fourth amendment rights are personal rights that 
cannot be asserted vicariously, II and because the protections secured 
by the amendment are violated only when the challenged conduct 
invades the legitimate expectations of privacy of the complainant 
himself rather than those of a third party,12 the issue of standing will 
not be considered distinct from the merits of a claimed infringement 
7. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 137-40 (1978); Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968); Mascolo, The Use at Trial of Suppression Hearing 
Admissions: An Erosion of the Privilege Against Se!/-Incrimination, 72 DICK. L. REV. I, 
30-31 (1967). 
8. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). 
9. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978). 
10. Id Accord, United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980). 
II. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 
223, 230 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). 
12. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980). This rule of restriction is so 
entrenched in legal precedent and adhered to that it will not brook exception even in the 
face of outrageous governmental conduct that shocks the conscience of the court under 
the rubric of due process. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Again, the 
limitations of due process come into play only when the official activity in question vio­
lates a personal right of the claimant. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. at 737 n.9. 
Under the target theory, those against whom a police investigation is directed have 
standing to object to an unreasonable search and seizure. Alderman v. United States, 
394 U.S. 165,205-06 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Carried to its logical conclusion, the 
target theory appears to sanction the vicarious assertion of fourth amendment rights. See 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132-33, 135 (1978); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 
261 (1960). See generally note 34 infra. 
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of a defendant's fourth amendment guarantees. 13 
In Jones v. United States, 14 the Supreme Court held that when 
the government is prosecuting for illegal possession, standing is auto­
matically conferred. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise 
would permit the prosecution to seek conviction for possession while 
allowing the prosecution to block suppression of the seized evidence 
by arguing that the defendant lacked the requisite possessory interest 
to establish standing. 15 The Court stated that it refused to sanction 
"such squarely contradictory assertions of power by the 
Government." 16 
The Jones Court offered a second rationale for the automatic 
standing rule in possessory offenses. The Court recognized that to 
require a person charged with a possessory offense to establish that 
he was a victim of an invasion of privacy would place him on the 
horns of a dilemmaY To establish a personal invasion of privacy, 
the defendant must claim either that he owned or possessed the 
seized property or that he had a substantial possessory interest in the 
premises searched. 18 If, however, the defendant claimed ownership 
or possession, he was faced with the possibility that his admission 
could be used against him at trial on the issue of guilt. 19 Forced to 
incriminate himself at the suppression hearing, the defendant, at the 
very least, would be "placed in the criminally tendentious position of 
explaining his possession of the premises."2o On the other hand, if 
the defendant denied possession or ownership of the property or a 
possessory interest in the premises, standing would not be conferred. 
To avoid this, the Court noted that the defendant may be tempted to 
perjure himself by claiming possession or ownership at the suppres­
sion hearing while denying possession at trial,21 By eliminating the 
necessity for a preliminary showing of an interest in the premises 
searched or the property seized, the automatic standing rule allowed 
the defendant to escape this dilemma.22 
Finally, in a separate basis for its decision, the Court observed 
that ."[e]ven were this not a prosecution turning on illicit possession, 
13. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978). 
14. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
15. Id. at 263-64. 
16. Id. at 264. 
17. Id. at 261-62. 
18. Id. at 261. 
19. Id. at 262. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 263. 
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the legally requisite interest in the premises was here satis­
fied...."23 The Court held that if a defendant was "legitimately 
on premises where ... [the] search [occurred he] may challenge its 
legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed 
to be used against him."24 
The persuasiveness of the dual rationale for the automatic 
standing rule pronounced in Jones has been eroded by subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions. Simmons v. United States25 effectively un­
dercut the self-incrimination justification by declaring that the sup­
pression hearing testimony of a defendant could not be used against 
him at trial on the issue of guilt "unless he makes no objection."26 
In Rakas v. Illinois27 and Rawlings v. Kentucky,28 the Court re­
jected the primary holding in Jones that possession of seized evi­
dence sufficient to establish criminal culpability also is sufficient to 
establish standing. "[L]egal possession of a seized good is not a 
proxy for determining whether the owner had a Fourth Amendment 
interest for it does not invariably represent the protected Fourth 
Amendment interest."29 The interest to be protected is that of a le­
gitimate expectation of privacy in the area of the search.30 Unless 
such a breach of privacy can be demonstrated, ownership of, or a 
possessory interest in, the items seized is not controlling on the issue 
of standing.3l Thus, the right to invoke the protections of the exclu­
sionary rule is dependent upon whether the rights of the accused 
have been violated by a particular search or seizure.32 Neither "a 
possessory interest in the items seized,"33 nor the assertion that the 
search is directed at the accused34 is sufficient to establish a protected 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 267. 
25. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
26. Id. at 394. Simmons represented a vindication of both the protection of pri­
vacy conferred by the fourth amendment and the right to be free of compelled self-in­
crimination secured by the fifth amendment. Id. at 393-94. 
27. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
28. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
29. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980). 
30. 448 U.S. at 104-06. 
31. /d.; United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-93 (1980). See 439 U.S. at 140, 
143, 148-49. 
32. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 87 n.4 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
133, 140 (1978). 
33. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93 (1980). 
34. 439 U.S. at 132-38. Under the target theory, an accused invokes the protection 
of the fourth amendment because the search or seizure complained of was directed at 
him, even though the execution of the search or seizure resulted in an alleged violation of 
the rights of a third party under the amendment. Although broader in scope than the 
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interest under the fourth amendment. 
The premises in Jones-the vice of prosecutorial self-contradic­
tion, the possibility of defendant self-incrimination, and the posses­
sion of the evidence seized as "an acceptable measure of Fourth 
Amendment interests"35-no longer remain as a viable foundation 
for the rule of automatic standing. Jones has been overruled.36 
In view of the foregoing analysis, it is not necessary for a court, 
in attempting to resolve the issue of standing, to conduct "a separate 
inquiry" into the issue of standing distinct from the merits of a de­
fendant's claim under the fourth amendment. Rather, a court will 
focus "directly on the substance of the defendant's claim that he. . . 
possessed a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' in the areas 
searched."37 Thus, the two inquiries have merged into one: whether 
the conduct of the police violated any legitimate expectation of pri­
vacy possessed by the accused.38 Further, the burden of proof rests 
upon the accused to demonstrate not only that the search com­
plained of was illegal, but also that he had a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the area of the search.39 Failure to sustain this two­
pronged burden will result in the denial of a motion to suppress. 
traditional concept of standing, which is premised on an infringement of personal fourth 
amendment guarantees, it is more limiting than the doctrine which sanctions standing 
whenever the fruits ofany unreasonable search or seizure are offered in evidence against 
an accused. Under this latter theory, if evidence is obtained in violation of the amend­
ment, that alone is determinative of the issue of suppression, and confers standing upon 
any criminal defendant against whom the fruits of the violation are proposed to be used. 
See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755,761,290 P.2d 855,857 (1955) (en banc) (standing 
conferred to deter illegal enforcement of the law, not to vindicate personal constitutional 
rights); Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 342, 356-58, 361, 365-66 (1967); Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search 
and Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488, 519-20. Moreover, this theory serves to effectively 
implement the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. See Mascolo, supra note 7, 
at 4-5. 
35. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980). 
36. Id. at 85, 93, 95. 
37. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
133, 138-40 (1978). A defendant's subjective expectation of privacy is not controlling. 
His expectation of privacy, to be legitimate, must be objectively reasonable. See id. at 
143-44 n.12. 
An indepth analysis of Rakas is beyond the scope of this article. For present pur­
poses, it is sufficient to note that Rakas rejected the continued labeling of the inquiry, on 
a determination of a motion to suppress, as one of standing, which Jones identified as 
separate and distinct under the target theory from the merits of a defendant's claim 
under the fourth amendment. 362 U.S. at 261,263,265,267. Instead, Rakas endorsed a 
shifting of emphasis to the substantive issue of whether the challenged search or seizure 
violated the rights of the movant under the fourth amendment. 439 U.S. at 133, 138-40. 
38. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980). 
39. Id. at 104; United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980). This is a stricter 
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The expectation of privacy standard recognizes that the rela­
tionship between a movant for exclusion and the area searched is 
essential to a determination of the privacy interests implicated by a 
particular search or seizure; that is, unless the movant can demon­
strate a personal privacy interest in the area searched, suppression 
will be denied, regardless of the illegality of the police conduct in­
volved.40 Thus, evidence may be excluded only if a search or seizure 
has violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights. This question 
can be answered only by determining whether "the challenged con­
duct [has] invaded [the movant's] legitimate expectation of privacy 
rather than that of a third party."41 
The descriptive phrase "expectation of privacy" embodies a de­
termination of the nexus between the area of a search and the indi­
vidual seeking to invoke fourth amendment issues, as well as an 
assessment of whether the conduct complained of is a search subject 
to constitutional limitations.42 The nexus between an individual 
seeking to invoke the protections of the fourth amendment and the 
area of a search is crucial to determining whether he has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the area of the search.43 In other words, a 
movant for suppression must demonstrate a relationship to the area 
searched sufficient to raise objections under the fourth amendment 
for the exclusionary rule to be invoked. 
Whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy 
will be assessed in light of the totality of the surrounding circum­
stances. Among the factors to be considered in a legitimate expecta­
standard than the legitimate presence rationale of Jones for invoking "the privacy of the 
premises searched." 362 U.S. at 267. 
40. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731, 735-37 (1980) (refusing to suppress 
evidence illegally seized from third party); Comment, Rakas v. Illinois: The End of 
Fourth Amendment Standing But Not ofFourth Amendment Confusion, 46 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 123, 140 n.92 (1979). See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142-43, 148-49 (1978). 
This position clearly is inconsistent with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. 
E.g., United Statesv. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206, 217 (1960). It would appear, that the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to 
expand the scope of the exclusionary rule reflects a certain discontent with the rule itself. 
For an analysis of the positive impact upon deterrence of the target theory of standing, 
see White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 1I8 U. PA. L. REV. 
333, 349-56 (1970). 
41. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis in original). 
42. Williamson, Fourth Amendment Standing and Expectations ofPrivacy: Rakas 
v. Illinois and New Directions/or Some Old Concepts, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 831, 845-46 
(1979). 
43. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980); UnitedStates v. Payner, 
447 U.S. 727, 731, 735-37 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 142-43, 144 n.12, 
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tion of privacy determination are the use made of the premises, the 
normal precautions taken to maintain privacy, the property interests 
of the objecting party in the area of the search, and whether the in­
trusion at issue would have been objectionable to the framers of the 
fourth amendment.44 Although legitimate presence on the premises 
is relevant to this analysis, it is not controlling.45 Moreover, a pro­
prietary or possessory relationship to the area of a search also is rele­
vant46 because "property rights reflect society's explicit recognition 
of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas. . . ."47 
Ultimately, the determinative factor will be a demonstrated privacy 
interest in the invaded place, with consideration of property concepts 
in assessing the legitimacy of expectations of privacy under the 
fourth amendment.48 
III. STEAGALD 
In Payton v. New York ,49 the Supreme Court held that a war­
rantless entry into the home of a suspect to execute a warrantless 
felony arrest is unreasonable under the fourth amendment in the ab­
sence of either consent or exigent circumstances. 50 The Court rea­
soned that both an arrest and a search effect a breach of the entrance 
to the home, and that "any differences in the intrusiveness [of either 
type of entry] are merely ones of degree rather than kind."51 Hence, 
both an arrest and a search implicate the same privacy interests and 
44. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). See 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). It has been 
noted that "Rakas has defined the scope of access to fourth amendment protection. . . 
as being intimately related to the interpretation accorded the substantive right." Note,. 
Rakas v. Illinois: The Fourth Amendment and Standing Revisited, 40 LA. L. REV. 962, 972 
(1980). Thus, the narrower the interpretation, the more restrictive the access to the af­
forded protection. Id. 
45. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978). 
46. See id. at 144 n.12, 149. For a discussion of the implications of Rakas' limiting 
the reach of fourth amendment protections to those individuals with substantial property 
interests in the area searched, see Gutterman, Fourth Amendment Privacy and Standing: 
"Wherever the Twain Shall Meet," 60 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1981); Mickenberg, Fourth Amend­
ment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois: From Property 10 Privacy and Back, 16 N. ENG. L. 
REV. 197 (1981); Williamson, supra note 42; Note, Criminal Procedure-The Demise of 
Standing 10 Assert Fourth Amendment Violations-United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 
(1980),3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 527 (1981); Comment, supra note 40. 
47. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). See Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
48. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 144 n.12 (1978). 
49. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
50. Id. at 576, 589-90. 
51. Id. at 589. 
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require the authority of a warrant.52 
Although the Court required that an arrest warrant be issued 
before the police may enter a suspect's home, the Court refused to 
sanction the additional requirement of a search warrant. The Court 
conceded that the presence of a search warrant might afford the indi­
vidual greater privacy protection than that provided by requiring 
only an arrest warrant. 53 The Court, however, determined that the 
requirement of an arrest warrant would "suffice to interpose the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous of­
ficer and the citizen."54 Therefore, if the evidence of guilt was suffi­
cient to satisfy the standards of probable cause for the issuance of an 
arrest warrant, it would be "constitutionally reasonable to require 
[the subject of the warrant] to open his doors to the officers of the 
law."55 Accordingly, a. valid arrest warrant "implicitly" authorizes 
entry into a suspect's residence when the officers executing the war­
rant have probable cause to believe that he is within.56 
The speciousness of this reasoning, in particular the relevance of 
probable cause evidence of guilt to the claim of a breach of the sepa­
rate privacy interest in the home,57 was recognized implicitly in Stea­
ga/d.58 In Steaga/d, the Supreme Court refined the Payton analysis 
by arguing that because an arrest warrant authorizes the police to 
deprive the subject of the warrant of his liberty, "it necessarily also 
authorizes a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it 
is necessary to arrest him in his home."59 
In Steaga/d, the Coun addressed an issue left open in Payton: 
the need for a search warrant in the routine execution of an arrest 
warrant when the suspect sought is in the home of a third party. The 
52. Id. at 589-90. 
53. Id. at 602. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 602-03. 
56. Id. at 603. 
57. See Mascolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants: TheSeizureofaSuspectin 
the Home ofa Third Party, 54 CONN. B.J. 299, 301-02 (1980). 
58. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
59. Id. at 214 n.7. This, of course, does not justify or clarify the inexplicable rele­
vance of probable cause evidence of guilt to probable cause presence in the home, see 
note 3 supra, nor does it address the separate privacy interests of other individuals resid­
ing in the home of the suspect. For a discussion of the separate privacy interests of these 
residents, see Comment, Arresting a Suspect in a Third Party's Home: What is Reason­
able?, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 293 (1981). Finally, it fails to explain why a 
probable cause determination of situs by police officers poses a lesser risk to privacy 
interests in the home of a suspect than it does to those interests in the residence of a third 
party. 
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Court concluded that there was such a need.60 
The Court began its analysis by reiterating its concern that law 
enforcement officers may lack that degree of objectivity required of a 
neutral and detached magistrate "to weigh correctly the strength of 
the evidence supporting the contemplated action against the individ­
ual's interests in protecting his own liberty and the privacy of his 
home."61 Moreover, an arrest warrant and a search warrant protect 
distinct interests under the fourth amendment, even though they 
both serve to subject the probable cause determination of law officers 
to judicial review and assessment. The primary function of an arrest 
warrant is to protect the individual from an unreasonable seizure by 
requiring a magistrate to issue such process only upon a showing 
that probable cause exists to believe that the subject sought has com­
mitted a criminal offense.62 In contrast, a search warrant serves to 
protect the privacy interest of the individual in his home and posses­
sions from the unjustified intrusion of the police by requiring a 
showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a 
search is situated in a particular place.63 
Thus, while the presence of an arrest warrant will protect the 
subject of the warrant from an unreasonable seizure, it will do noth­
ing to protect the privacy interests of a third party in the sanctity of 
his home when the police attempt to execute the warrant there on the 
basis of their personal determination of probable cause. The Court 
held that such judicially "untested determinations" are too unrelia­
ble to justify a routine entry into a person's home to search for a 
suspect in the absence of a search warrant.64 The Court observed 
that to permit the police, absent exigent circumstances, to decide if 
there is sufficient justification to search the home of a third party for 
the subject of an arrest warrant creates "a significant potential for 
abuse."65 Armed with an arrest warrant for a single person, the po­
lice, for example, could "search all the homes of that individual's 
friends and acquaintances."66 As the fourth amendment operates to 
60. 451 U.S. at 222. 
61. Id. at 212. See also, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980); 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
449-51 (1971) (plurality opinion); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); Mc­
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 
10, 13-14 (1948). 
62. 451 U.S. at 212. 
63. Id. at 212-13. 
64. Id. at 213. 
65. Id. at 215. 
66. Id. 
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prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful action by the police, it man­
dates the participation of a neutral and detached magistrate in the 
probable cause determination as "an essential element of a reason­
able search or seizure ...."67 The Court reasoned that absent a 
particularized judicial determination that the subject is present in the 
home of a third party, the search is as unreasonable from the home­
owner's perspective as a search conducted in the absence of 
warrant.68 
Finally, the Court addressed the interests implicated in Payton. 
The Court stated that when an individual is the subject of an arrest 
warrant, his interest in being free from an unreasonable entry into 
his home is subordinate to the authority conferred by the arrest war­
rant to deprive the subject of his freedom: This authority necessarily 
sanctions a limited invasion of the subject's privacy interest in the 
execution of the warrant process.69 This reasoning, however, is inap­
plicable when an arrest warrant is executed in the residence of a 
third party. The Court emphasized that in the latter situation the 
warrant "embodies no judicial determination whatsoever regarding 
the person whose home is to be searched."70 Because the arrest war­
rant does not authorize the police to deprive the third-party home­
owner of his liberty, it may not be used to deprive him of his privacy 
interest in his home. Absent exigent circumstances or valid consent, 
such an interest only can be deprived by a magistrate upon an ade­
quate showing that the object of the search is located in the third 
party's home.7) 
By demonstrating the distinct privacy interests protected respec­
tively by arrest and search warrants, Steagald served to dichotomize 
the legitimate expectations of privacy of the subject of an arrest war­
rant from those of a third-party homeowner. As to the former, he 
seeks protection from an unreasonable seizure. As to the latter, he 
seeks protection from unjustified intrusions into the privacy of his 
home and his possessions. These respective interests are mutually 
exclusive. Therefore, the respective expectations of privacy are 
equally exclusive, with the derivative result that each is irrelevant to 
the other. This, in tum, will prevent either the subject of an arrest 
warrant or the owner of a residence where the subject is appre­
67. Id. at 216. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
68. 451 U.S. at 216. 
69. Id. at 214 n.7. 
70. Id. 
71. /d. 
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hended from complaining about unreasonable governmental intru­
sions upon the privacy interests of the other.72 




A fundamental fourth amendment principle is that the individ­
ual's "'legitimate expectations of privacy' "73 from unreasonable 
searches or seizures are most pronounced in the home.74 To secure 
these interests, the framers of the fourth amendment erected certain 
barriers to forcible and warrantless entries by government officers 
into the home.75 Chief among these barriers is the requirement of a 
warrant.76 Accordingly, and in furtherance of this broadly perceived 
requirement, the execution of an arrest warrant for a suspect in the 
home of a third party requires the authority of a search warrant to 
secure the privacy concerns of the homeowner.77 These privacy in­
terests, however, are personal to the homeowner and may not be as­
serted vicariously by those for whom the privacy expectations are 
not justified.7s 
Wherever an individual may be, he carries with him expecta­
tions of privacy with regard to the integrity and dignity of his per­
son.79 Thus, he may invoke his fourth amendment right to privacy 
wherever he may legitimately anticipate freedom from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion.so As these expectations are most pro­
nounced in private areas, such as residences,sl when the subject of 
72. This separation of interests serves to reinforce the prohibition against the vica­
rious assertion of fourth amendment rights. See notes 10-12 & 37-41 supra and accom­
panying text. 
73. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979). 
74. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980). 
75. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 363 (1974). 
76. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980). 
77. Steaga1d v. United States, 451 U,S. 204, 213-16 (1981). 
78. See id. at 213-14 & n.7; United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1980); 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 142 
(1978); United States v. Briones-Garza, 651 F.2d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (by implica­
tion); United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 951, 955 (8th Cir.) (Ross, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978). 
79. State v. Dias, 52 Hawaii 100, 106,470 P.2d 510, 514 (1970). See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1,9 (1968). 
80. State v. Matias, 51 Hawaii 62,65-66,451 P.2d 257, 259 (1969). See Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 359 
(1967). 
81. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980). 
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an arrest warrant enters the home of a third party the protections of 
the fourth amendment enter with him.82 His expectations of privacy 
in the home, however, may be "separate and distinct" from those of 
other individuals, depending upon the degree of legitimacy that at­
taches to such interests in the area searched.83 
The privacy concerns of a third party in his home primarily are 
those of the third party himself. These include the right to be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusions into his home, posses­
sions, and private papers.84 These interests are separate and distinct 
from those of the subject of an arrest warrant, and are not the con­
cern of the subject who is in the home of a third party as a casual 
visitor or guest. 85 Nor are they those of the subject of an arrest war­
rant who resides in the third party's home when the warrant is being 
executed for his person.86 He can have no subjective expectation 
that the third-party residence will remain free from governmental 
intrusion.87 The subject is entitled to insist upon the authority of an 
arrest warrant to protect him from an unreasonable seizure.88 Be­
yond that, he may not insist. As a casual visitor, guest, or resident, 
he receives all the protection he may legitimately expect when he is 
apprehended in execution of an arrest warrant in the home of a third 
party. In this setting, the execution of an arrest warrant permits a 
limited intrusion upon the subject's otherwise legitimate expectations 
of privacy.89 
Undoubtedly, the subject of an arrest warrant possesses certain 
privacy interests in the home of a third party. These interests en­
compass the right to be free from an unreasonable seizure90 and the 
freedom to secure the personal integrity of one's papers and effects 
from unwarranted governmental encroachment.91 But these inter­
82. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 9 (1968). 
83. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979). 
84. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981); Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886). 
85. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 142 (1978); id. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring). For example, the homeowner pos­
sesses a separate right to exclude others, which itself confers upon him a legitimate ex­
pectation of privacy, and constitutes one of the fundamental rights attaching to property. 
Id. at 143-44 & n.12. 
86. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980). 
87. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980). 
88. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981). 
89. See id. at 214 n.7; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980). 
90. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981). 
91. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 n.ll (1978). 
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ests are secured fully by the presence of an arrest warrant, which 
protects the individual from an unreasonable seizure and limits the 
scope of the intrusion to the areas of the residence where the subject 
may be 10cated.92 It will not sanction a rummaging among his pa­
pers and effects. The scope of a properly conducted incidental 
search and plain view seizure will be limited, respectively, to the per­
son of the arrestee, the area within his immediate reach,93 and the 
area that is in open view while the police are conducting a properly 
limited quest for the subject or incidental search.94 
In the typical situation, it is only the third-party homeowner 
who has a legitimate expectation. of privacy in his own residence suf­
ficient to invoke the protection of a search warrant.95 The subject of 
an arrest warrant, however, may not vicariously assert the security of 
such protection.96 Thus, in order to invoke the protection of the 
fourth amendment, an accused must establish that he had a legiti­
mate expectation of privacy in the area of an illegal search or 
seizure.97 Even if an accused can demonstrate the existence of such 
a privacy interest in the premises of a third party,98 he may not 
thereby invoke a protection that exceeds the privacy ambit attaching 
to him in his own home. It is in precisely such a setting that Payton 
taught the lack of a need for a search warrant.99 
Steagald "[rested] on a very special set of facts...."100 If the 
subject of an arrest warrant resides in a particular dwelling for a 
significant period of time, it will be considered his home for purposes 
of the fourth amendment. 101 This will be so even if it is the residence 
of a third party, others are living there, "and ... the suspect concur­
92. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 518 (1971) (White, J., concurring & 
dissenting); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 159 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dictum). 
93. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). 
94. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 & n.24 (1971) (plurality 
opinion). 
95. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14 & n.7 (1981); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978). 
96. United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 951, 955 (8th Cir.) (Ross, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978). See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1980); 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Groot, Arrests in Private Dwellings, 67 VA. 
L. REV. 275, 284 n.44 (1981). 
97. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980). 
98. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 142-43 (1978); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224,227-28 (1972) (per curiam). 
99. 445 U.S. at 602. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 230-31 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Note, Criminal Law-Search and Seizure: Fourth Amendment 
Limitations on Warrantless Entries to Arrest, 46 Mo. L. REV. 423, 437 (1981). 
100. 451 U.S. at 230 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 230-31. 
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rently maintains a residence elsewhere as well."102 In this situation, 
the police may enter the premises with only an arrest warrant. 103 On 
the other hand, if the subject is a mere transient visitor or guest in 
the residence of a third party, he may not invoke the privacy inter­
ests of his host so as to require the additional authority and protec­
tion of a search warrant. 104 The more fleeting his connection with 
the premises, "the more likely that exigent circumstances will exist 
justifying immediate police action without departing to obtain a 
search warrant." 105 
Surely, the subject's expectations of privacy in the home of the 
third party cannot exceed those in his own residence where he may 
not demand the additional protection of a search warrant. More­
over, as Steagald held, the protection to which the subject is entitled 
under the fourth amendment-the authority of an arrest warrant-is 
that which he is receiving. 106 The presence of the warrant secures 
him from an unreasonable seizure and is the essence of the privacy 
protection to which he is entitled under the amendment. 
v. CONCLUSION 
In Steagald v. United States, 107 the Supreme Court required that 
a search warrant be issued before an arrest warrant could be exe­
cuted in a third party's home. The requirement of a search warrant 
for the execution of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party 
secures to the homeowner the protection of his legitimate expecta­
tions of privacy in his residence. These are separate and distinct 
from the privacy concerns of the suspect, which are protected by the 
102. Id. at 231. 
103. Id. at 230-31. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980). 
104. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14 & n.7 (1981); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Lee v. Gilstrop, 661 F.2d 999, 1000 (4th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam); United States v. Meyer, 656 F.2d 979, 981-82 (5th Cir. 1981) (transient visitor 
lacked requisite expectation of privacy to insist upon presence of search warrant for resi­
dent's apartment); United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 951,955 (8th Cir.) (Ross, J., concur­
ring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 976 (1978); People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160,445 N.Y.S.2d 
57,429 N.E.2d 735 (1981); Note, supra note 99, at 437-38; if. United States v. Clifford, 
664 F.2d 1090, 1093 (8th Cir. 1981) (arrestee's legitimate expectation of privacy in third 
party's home not crucial; Payton sanctions presence of only an arrest warrant for home­
owner himself, and arrestee-guest can claim no greater protection); United States v. 
Briones-Garza, 651 F.2d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (questionable whether guard at "drop 
house" for illegal aliens had standing to object to absence of search warrant in the execu­
tion of an arrest warrant for a third party; vacated and remanded for hearing on issue). 
105. 451 U.S. at 231 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 214 n.7. 
107. Id. at 204. 
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presence of the arrest warrant. Further, the suspect may not vicari­
ously invoke the privacy interests of a third party under the fourth 
amendment and is entitled only to the same privacy expectations in 
the home of the third party that are secured to him in his own resi­
dence. Although Steagald did not address the question whether the 
subject of an arrest warrant has the right to the privacy protection of 
a search warrant, the presence of the arrest warrant secures him from 
an unreasonable seizure. The courts should not require a search 
warrant in the event that a claim of exigent circumstances is rejected. 
